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CGD advised President Sirleaf as she prepared to take office on issues ranging from debt relief to donor relations.

Their work included aid coordination, aid quality, debt relief, poverty reduction and growth strategies, capacity building, and civil service reform, among other issues. From its launch in to its end in , the Scott Family Liberia Fellows Program provided an opportunity for five or six young professionals to work for one year as special assistants to top officials in Liberia.

Scott, Jr. This level of engagement in a developing country is unusual for CGD because the Center's primary focus is on improving the policies and practices of the rich world towards development. In addition to being of use to Liberia, the relationship provided CGD with a unique opportunity to observe the complex interactions between donors and a developing country in the early stages of recovery from conflict. Edward W. Scott Jr. After consulting with CGD senior fellow Steve Radelet -- who has been assisting President Sirleaf as an economic advisor since her election in late -- on options to be considered for this special assistance, he decided to sponsor a select group of highly trained young professionals to serve in Liberia for one year as special assistants to members of Liberia's Cabinet.

The program is called the Scott Family Liberia Fellows program. Its first group included three Liberian expatriates and three young professionals of other nationalities. This first group of fellows began working in Monrovia in June Debt relief proponents see it as a momentous leap in the battle against global poverty. CGD research fellow Todd Moss argues that actual gains in poverty reduction will be modest and slow. State building is creating and strengthening the institutions necessary to support long-term economic, social, and political development.

In the U. Terrorists training at bases in Afghanistan and Somalia. Poverty, disease, and humanitarian emergencies overwhelming governments in Haiti and Central Africa. A common thread runs through these disparate crises that form the fundamental foreign policy and security challenges of our time.

These crises originate in, spread to, and disproportionately affect developing countries where governments lack the capacity, and sometimes the will, to respond. These weak and failed states matter to American security, American values, and the prospects for global economic growth upon which the American economy depends. In this new CGD working paper, CGD senior fellow Steve Radelet explores the challenges Liberia faces in revitalizing economic growth after 25 years of gross economic mismanagement and 14 years of brutal civil war.

He examines the new government's progress, including the major steps it has taken in its first 18 months and the unique way that it has organized government-donor relations. Based upon patterns of post-conflict recovery in several other African countries, he suggests that Liberia's recovery is likely to proceed in three phases: an immediate phase driven by aid and rebounding urban services; renewal of traditional natural resource-based activities; and, finally, processed products and other goods and services that can compete on global markets.

Radelet writes from a unique perspective: he is serving as an advisor to Liberian president Ellen Johnson Sirleaf. Does aid to Africa undermine the emergence of a robust African middle class? If so, what can be done about it? In this new working paper, CGD president Nancy Birdsall argues that high and unpredictable aid flows could be making life harder for Africa's small and medium-sized businesses by, for example, inflating wages and making governments less reliant on domestic revenue—and hence less accountable to taxpayers.

Activities under the DSR program are vetted and authorized by the U. The objective of Operation Onward Liberty is to help the Liberian government "build a professional military that is apolitical, subordinate to civilian leadership, and respectful of human rights. Such continuing training is viewed as a critical follow-up to previous basic training; according to the UNSG, "it is assessed that the Armed Forces of Liberia will not be independently operational before , given that the Force's officer corps needs significant additional experience before it is able to take command.

DIRI team was slated to take place in mid-April and at six-week intervals thereafter. A longer-term program roadmap, with associated benchmarks, will also be designed and implemented. These activities will be assessed every months. While the United States is currently continuing to provide operations and maintenance support to the AFL, as defense sector capacity-building proceeds, the long-term success and sustainability of the effort will increasingly rely on the ability of the Liberian government to adequately manage and fund the new AFL.

Funding, in particular, may pose a significant challenge, given Liberia's modest annual national budget. While some may contend that Liberia can ill afford to unilaterally fund a national military, the need for continued AFL and MOD professionalization is widely viewed as crucial, for multiple reasons. Prominent among these is a core national defense rationale: Liberia lies within a sub-region that has experienced substantial political instability and cross-border armed conflict in recent decades, and must be able to defend its territorial integrity.

Such investments are also seen as being necessitated by a need to prevent a recurrence of the politically destabilizing role that Liberia's military and state security forces have played in the past. Training and constitutionally based military institution-building are seen as necessary in order to ensure that the new AFL does not intervene in civilian politics or engage in other extra-legal activities.

While there are no indications that the new AFL—which is explicitly designed to function as an apolitical, professional force—is a likely to reprise such a destabilizing role, there have been occasional problems of AFL absenteeism, rank and file protests about living conditions, and some reports of indiscipline among some AFL members, in some cases of a violent or criminal nature, or involving intoxicants.

It is notable that, as of early , while U. As described elsewhere in this report, the Liberian security sector reform SSR process has relied heavily on U. Adapted U. In the view of a number of observers, such external inputs were essential because rapid military reform was widely seen as crucial to building long-term stability, and post-war Liberia largely lacked requisite financial, human, and other resource capacities.

Similarly, the strong American role was seen as apropos because Liberia has long drawn from U. The extensive foreign role in Liberia's SSR process, however, may also pose challenges for the long-term sustainability of the outcomes of the SSR process since, while historically U.

As a result, to the extent that the institutions and processes that SSR produces were not initially organically or integrally defined by local cultural norms and socio-political authority, interests, and needs, over the long-term, these influences may reshape the resulting institutions, potentially in a manner at odds with their original formal purposes.

Similarly, to the degree that their design did not incorporate adequate public input, their political legitimacy might be called into question. For instance, while some observers were concerned that a U.

In order to protect Liberia's mile coast line and associated nautical mile exclusive economic zone against periodic poaching by foreign trawlers, potential drug trafficking, human trafficking, piracy, and illicit maritime dumping, as well as the need for search and rescue capacities, Liberia is developing a coast guard.

The effort is dependent, in large part, on the provision of U. The field program is coordinated and carried out by the U. Navy elements. It subsequently produced an assessment report and recommendations based on its findings, which it presented to the U. The assessment report, which was comprehensive and included a number of core recommendations, was intended to function as a guideline for the creation of a more detailed LCG development plan.

It urged that Liberia fully construct and staff LCG primary headquarters facilities at Freeport, Monrovia's main port, prior to establishing additional LCG stations, and that the LCG carefully coordinate the timing of training, facilities and infrastructure preparation, and equipment acquisitions.

A crucial overarching recommendation was that LCG development be guided by a full-time, well experienced advisor or advisory team. The Liberian government concurred with these recommendations and initiated development of a LCG with a mission to carry out scaled down versions of applicable USCG functions e. Further MTT training is expected to continue for multiple years and may be periodically supplemented by U. Navy training. Navy Construction Battalion Sea Bee team, which is building waterfront facilities e.

Two foot Defender-class boats for use in harbor and near-coast operations are expected to be provided to the LCG by the United States in late , along with approximately two years worth of associated equipment.

The duration of U. Government policies" in support of "the development of long term personal relationships and interagency coordination mechanisms that would not otherwise exist. Embassy-Monrovia country plans. Reciprocal senior leadership country consultative visits between the Michigan NG and Liberian MOD would then occur, and a partnership plan would be finalized. The Liberian government has voiced support for the new U. Africa Command, and offered to host it in the region, although most observers see this as unlikely, given the poor state of Liberian infrastructure and limited state capacity and resources.

Liberia has received multiple U. Marine training for the AFL, humanitarian and development material and medical services donations, and cultural programming. Navy-led effort, the APS program conducts ship visits to ports in the region during which a variety of training, capacity-building, humanitarian, and cultural activities are undertaken.

The APS program, housed on U. Liberia is the signatory of a ship boarding agreement with the United States under the Proliferation Security Initiative, a U. The United Nations reports that police reform and restructuring efforts have made significant progress but that significant challenges remain. LNP deployment to the field, particularly up-country, is limited and has faced constraints, such as lack of basic infrastructure and police equipment, including vehicles, fuel, and communication gear, for which the LNP is largely dependent on donor support.

In part due to limited police and broad justice sector operational weaknesses, incidents of mob violence and vigilante justice remain common. While the challenges facing the LNP remain substantial, diverse efforts to address them are being pursued, including the development of a Professional Standards Division to effectively investigate complaints of LNP misconduct and efforts to prevent absenteeism by vetting LNP payroll records and the duty status of officers.

In mid, the LNP, in collaboration with U. Little donor support had been provided to fund the plans as of early , but in the UNDP established a Liberia Justice and Security Trust Fund, and some donors are reportedly interested in funding police needs though it or on a bilateral basis.

Due to previous U. It is intended to provide armed backing for regular LNP officers and respond to situations of public disorder. The ERU is designed to provide mobile capacity to respond rapidly and robustly to critical threats to internal security or public safety, particularly in anticipation of the eventual departure of UNMIL from Liberia.

The ERU has a current strength of , with an additional 47 staff expected to join the force after completing training in March Originally envisioned as a person force, in response to the current level of tactical demands on the unit, it will not be further expanded in the short-term. While the ERU has been a key recipient of foreign capacity building assistance, its long term sustainability and effectiveness may be curtailed by resource constraints and lack of equipment and vehicles necessary to reach remote parts of Liberia, notably after the eventual termination of UNMIL.

Due to very poor road conditions in many parts of Liberia, the unit is heavily "dependent on UNMIL air assets to deploy quickly, particularly during the rainy season. The U. CIVPOL officers, as well as equipment and contractor-based logistical support, in addition to other police capacity-building support. Improved police-community relations and human rights abuse prevention are keystones of this training. A another component of INL support is the deployment of a U.

In FY, the Obama Administration plans to deploy additional ERU advisors to provide field training and mentoring program for the ERU; provide training and equipping for the PSU; and provide non-lethal equipment and support police infrastructure improvements. The general aims of the JSSL program are to improve the administration of justice and bolster adherence to the rule of law generally and respect for human rights.

The JSSL deploys justice sector legal and technical advisors, provides training, professional mentoring, and equipment, and helps develop and strengthen justice sector effectiveness and infrastructure. The program focuses on the judicial system broadly, including the Ministry of Justice, the corrections system, and other rule of law organizations.

It has helped create Liberia's first ever public defender program, train prosecutors, renovate the main judicial building in Monrovia, create a case-numbering system slated to be scaled up nationally, and enhance LNP-prosecutor linkages, as well as providing some vehicles and equipment in support of such functions.

Current efforts seek to expand capacities outside of Monrovia. It was a roughly 1,member presidential protection unit that functioned under the NTGL and the Taylor government.

Under Taylor, the SSS—which was run by Benjamin Yeaten, a former Taylor militia commander who is currently being sought by the Sirleaf government for alleged treasonous activities—gained a reputation for brutality. The SSS has continued to have a sometimes troubled reputation. Some members of the leadership that initially served under the Sirleaf Administration were viewed by informed observers as unprofessional and corrupt. Multiple acts of arbitrary violence committed by SSS officers have been reported.

There are press reports, however, that allege that some decommissioned SSS officers had not received their severance packages, and there have been protests associated with such claims. Some protesting claimants, however, are reportedly ineligible to receive severance payments.

The restructuring process, which seeks to correct reported leadership weaknesses and professionalize all aspects of SSS organization and operations, is being undertaken with the assistance of the State Department's Diplomatic Security Service DSS. About SSS agents received basic close protection support and perimeter training in Liberia.

Humanitarian conditions are much improved from the context of severe and widespread post-war need that was prevalent in the years after the war, but high rates of poverty remains endemic. Liberia continues to receive substantial international food aid and is highly donor-dependent. International assistance is, however, increasingly supporting resettlement and socioeconomic recovery, rather than emergency humanitarian needs.

According to a U. By late April , over , Liberian internally displaced persons IDPs , including over 59, families, had returned to their places of origin or resettled. Most had received resettlement assistance, usually consisting of basic non-food items, transport aid, and two months of food supplies. Nearly all child ex-combatants were reportedly been reintegrated into their communities of origin, and many received follow-up aid in the form of social services.

In mid-March , the U. Liberia faces substantial public health challenges. Malaria is endemic, water-born stomach illnesses are common, tuberculosis cases often go uncured, and there are periodic outbreaks of diseases like Yellow Fever, measles, and cholera, but Liberia lacks an adequate health infrastructure for combating such illnesses. A number of donor-backed initiatives help improve health care capacity, however.

WHO coordinates a U. A demographic and health survey showed that the national adult HIV infection rate was 1. The World Health Organization, in coordination with other U. Liberia receives Global Fund assistance, but its application for further assistance under the Fund's recent Round 5 funding project assessment process was reportedly rejected. These include the demographic health survey, in partnership with other donors, which includes HIV surveillance; targeted behavior change efforts focusing on youth and other groups; and support for home-based care and related assistance.

Pierson that Liberia be considered for U. Liberia's supreme law is its constitution, effective since It provides for a political and legal system that is substantially modeled on that of the United States, though not entirely; for instance, federalism is absent.

Liberia's government is made up of three branches that exercise separate powers and authorities: a bicameral legislature, which consists of a member House and a member Senate; a presidentially led executive branch that controls multiple line ministries and several independent agencies; and a judiciary. Legislators are directly elected by voters in each of Liberia's 15 counties, while the president is directly elected by universal suffrage.

The President and House Members are each elected to six-year terms, and Senators serve nine-year terms, except in cases of irregular vacancies of elected positions. Presidents may serve up to two terms. Although the Sirleaf government's mandate is derived from the constitution, that of the NTGL was extra-constitutional. During its tenure, those provisions of the Constitution and laws of Liberia that were inconsistent with the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement were suspended, though all other provisions of the constitution remained in force.

Although Liberia's constitution provides for a system of checks and balances among the three branches of government, in practice the executive branch has historically exerted extensive influence over the legislature, the judiciary, and local governments.

Historically, Liberian presidents have wielded exceptional, sometimes extra-constitutional powers and closely controlled the legal system, the security forces, and the economy, as well as headed majority ruling parties. Liberia has also long suffered from the effects of public sector corruption and a tradition of political patronage. This often resulted in uneven, urban-centered socioeconomic development and often deprived large segments of the population, notably the rural indigenous majority, of access to public goods and services.

Given this history, President Sirleaf could have attempted to aggregate predominant power in her office, but doing so would have run counter to her emphasis on building national unity, constitutional and institutionally robust governance, fighting corruption, and institutionally developing the state. Her emphasis on developing state institutions and processes, rather than exerting presidential command authority may mean that she is both less likely and less able to rule in the largely unilateral manner of her predecessors.

However, she also came to power with a weaker electoral mandate than those of past presidents; neither Sirleaf's Unity Party nor any other party commands a legislative majority.

Similarly, no candidate was able to command majority support in the initial candidate presidential first round presidential vote. To date, however, President Sirleaf has often been able to dominate the national policy agenda. This is attributable, in part, to a tradition of strong executive leadership; limited capacity within the legislature; the limited legislative experience of many current legislators; the fractionalized party make-up of the legislature; and to the governing experience of Sirleaf and many in her cabinet.

Most bills continue to be originated by the executive branch and passed with presidential priorities intact. A notable exception to this pattern was the legislature's September rejection of the asset seizures bill targeting former president Taylor and his associates. A key impetus for the Sirleaf administration's policy emphasis on anti-corruption initiatives was the mixed governance record of its predecessor, the NTGL.

The NTGL was able to successfully carry out most of the basic functions assigned to it under the August peace accord, but its efforts to restore state authority and the rehabilitate state institutions were hampered by central government ministry inefficiencies, widespread resource constraints, and lack of institutional and financial system capacities and trained manpower. Despite such challenges, it did make significant progress during the last half of its tenure.

During this time, many revenue, customs, immigration, and local officials were deployed to sites outside Monrovia. Regional Central Bank offices were also opened, permitting salary payments without recourse to time-consuming travel to Monrovia. The process of deploying government officials upcountry was supported by USAID, which has supported the rehabilitation of administrative buildings in several key counties.

Among the most challenging issues facing governance capacity-building efforts were persistent reports of corruption within the NTGL, in some cases on a large scale. Alleged acts were particularly notable in the context of import-export transactions, government contracts and budgeting, and the issuance of commodity marketing or land, natural resource, and associated concession rights.

The World Bank and bilateral donors made similar observations and called for transparency measures. National fiscal and budget obligation mechanisms and voucher record-keeping systems under the NTGL were chaotic and subject to manipulation by key officials in some cases. Actions by the transitional legislature either to appropriate for private use or pay very nominal lease fees for expensive vehicles that each legislator was given drew local and foreign condemnation.

In November , the U. Embassy in Monrovia stated that the U. This drains vital government resources that could otherwise be used for critical developmental programs, and sends the wrong signal to international donors who finance such programs. It also perpetuates the culture of abuse of public trust and impunity that has contributed to two decades of decline in Liberia.

Embassy considers these transfers unscrupulous, irresponsible, and contrary to the public interest of the people of Liberia. Liberian government resources are for the benefit of the Liberian people and should not be misappropriated for private use. Citing a presidential proclamation, it stated that Liberian government officials who engage in "violations of the public trust" and persons who abet such actions might, along with their families, be ineligible for U.

Bryant pled innocent to the charges, which were laid against him in February and carry a possible year prison sentence. At trial in April , Bryant unsuccessfully claimed constitutionally derived sovereign immunity from prosecution on the basis that he was a serving head of state at the time his alleged crimes took place. Court proceedings in all of these cases have often been slow and protracted. Natural resource and land concession contract deals drew attention during the NTGL's tenure because of their financial significance and potential long-term effects on national development.

Some observers also questioned the NTGL's award of offshore oil exploration permits to three relatively small firms just prior to elections. The NTGL also signed two major long-term natural resource concession deals. One, with the Firestone group of companies, extends and amends a previous series of concession agreements, first signed in , giving Firestone rights to large plantation areas for the cultivation of rubber.

It was extendable for an additional 50 years after renegotiation. Another deal, with Netherlands-based Mittal Steel Holdings, provided for the rehabilitation or construction of diverse mining, administrative support, processing, and transport infrastructure intended to support the extraction and shipment of iron ore from northern Liberia.

The initial term of 25 years was extendable for an additional year term, if certain criteria were met. Both deals drew criticism from some civil society groups that contended that the NTGL lacked a legal mandate to negotiate long-term concessions, that such functions could only be carried out by a duly elected government, and that such deals should be negotiated in a manner more favorable to Liberian economic and other national interests.

Some civil society critics have alleged that the deals were not undertaken in a transparent manner. Ambassador to Liberia, John Blaney, reportedly pushed for a deal that would require that a major railroad that was to be rehabilitated as part of any proposed iron ore investment arrangement would be made into a multi-use railroad, regardless of what firm was awarded mining rights.

The Firestone contract has also drawn attention for other reasons. Some Firestone plantation workers have complained about poor working conditions and high production quotas.

Some environmental advocacy groups and residents living near Firestone rubber processing facilities have alleged that chemicals used in latex processing are polluting wells and the water and aquatic life of the Farmington River, and damaging these resources or preventing their use by local residents. A Firestone spokesperson reportedly stated that Firestone "consistently" samples water from the Farmington River, is in compliance with relevant Liberian environmental laws, and has developed multiple safe drinking wells areas in its plantation concession area.

The Firestone group is the subject of a class action suit brought in California by the International Labor Rights Fund, an advocacy organization that says its goal is to counter child, forced, and other abusive labor practices internationally, including through litigation.

The suit alleges that Firestone employs children, practices forced labor, involuntary servitude, and negligent employment practices. Firestone categorically denies these charges, describing the suit as "outrageous" and "completely without merit.

In June , a U. District Court Indianapolis Division, Southern District of Indiana judge granted Firestone's motion to dismiss 11 of 12 counts in the case, but denied the motion with regard to one count, a child labor claim made under international law and the Alien Tort Statute ATS.

In late April , Firestone production was decreased as a result of a labor strike that reportedly concerned worker benefits, rivalry over leadership control of the union, and issues related to talks on a collective bargaining agreement.

Labor activists had long contended that the previous Firestone union, whose leadership had launched a court case to prevent the new union from being legally recognized, was a company-controlled entity. Firestone reportedly refused to recognize the new union prior to its legitimation in court.

Upon taking office, President Sirleaf vowed to review and renegotiate concession contracts signed by the NTGL to ensure that they were fair, provided Liberia with favorable terms, and did not cede national financial or other interests to foreign firms, or give such firms undue control over variables such as future prices or regulatory powers. A renegotiated contract with ArcelorMittal the name of the firm after a merger took effect in May The government projects that the new contract will eventually generate as many as 20, jobs for Liberians.

The Liberian government has released a detailed summary comparing the old Mittal contract and the new one. Global Witness, however, continues to criticize what it asserts is the contract's "precedence over Liberian law on income tax, royalties and other payments due to government.

The re-negotiation of a new contract with Firestone was finished in early , and the agreement is slated to be submitted to the legislature. According to President Sirleaf, the agreement. This model agreement subjects Firestone, for the first time in its eighty-two year history of operations, to the payment of taxes of general application; to a five year plan of providing better living conditions for workers and employees; and to limited land holdings.

The Sirleaf government also plans to use the new Firestone contract as a model agreement in separate renegotiations of other rubber and palm oil plantation concession agreements. The NTGL took some steps to halt corrupt practices. It established a Task Force on Corruption and a Cash Management Committee and attempted to eliminate bribe-taking in relation to commodity imports, notably by better managing Monrovia's port, of which UNMIL took temporary control in late April In addition, the National Transitional Legislative Assembly NTLA created a committee to investigate allegations of administrative and financial irregularities by its leadership, which eventually led to the removal of key NTLA leaders.

An African Development Bank loan was reportedly not disbursed in because Liberia failed to provide required fiscal data, and an ECOWAS-sponsored auditing mission was opposed by Liberian auditors and certain government officials, who cited concern over a violation of Liberian sovereignty, despite the publicly stated support of Chairman Bryant for the audit. In July , Chairman Bryant suspended two officials over their alleged diversion of funds paid by the satellite communications firm Inmarsat to several Liberian state entities, and the NTGL suspended three Bureau of Maritime Affairs officials, including the Commissioner, and Liberia's International Maritime Organization representative for fraud.

To help the NTGL tackle corruption, the United States sent several Treasury Department experts to advise the Liberian government in the areas of budget and tax policy, management, and administration and in central bank operations and fiscal policy and regulation. These U. A resident U. Similar efforts have continued under the Sirleaf administration. Concerns over transparency produced a sometimes halting and often highly conditional provision of pledged aid by donor governments and agencies to NTGL-led Liberia, as well as some reticence to offer new funding.

This negatively affected the scale and pace of resettlement, reintegration, and socioeconomic rehabilitation. Nonetheless, a network of national, international, U. Most of them participate in an inter-sectoral, U. Liberian-donor government relations have improved under President Sirleaf, in large part due to her strong support for anti-corruption and other economic governance efforts.

In late January , she announced a financial audit of the outgoing transitional government, which had repeatedly been accused of corruption. Sirleaf has also suggested that she may seek a review of other public contracts and concession deals granted by the NTGL. It reviewed the legality and propriety of logging concession contracts and recommended diverse logging sector reforms. Sirleaf's action effectively canceled all existing logging concessions and created a Forestry Reform Monitoring Committee FRMC to regulate future concession contracts.

The natural resources and human rights policy advocacy group Global Witness, which has tracked abuses and corruption in Liberia's forestry sector for several years, praised the move. It was also given the tasks of advising on the implementation of GEMAP goals see below as they pertain to the Liberian Forestry Development Authority; ensuring the full and transparent participation of communities and civil society in forest management, conducting a full review of the forestry laws and regulations; and recommending legislation to implement forestry reforms.

Sirleaf's cancellation of prior logging concessions and creation of the FRMC were seen as key steps prompting the U. Security Council to pass Resolution on June 20, , which lifted the ban on Liberian timber exports first imposed under Security Council Resolution In passing Resolution , the Security Council cited the Sirleaf administration's "commitment to transparent management of the country's forestry resources for the benefit of Liberians and its reforms in the timber sector.

Global Witness opposed the Security Council's lifting of sanctions, contending that the Liberian government lacks full control over forest lands and has not yet adequately reformed the forestry sector. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control is reportedly currently preparing updated regulations to allow the import of Liberian timber into the United States.

In early October , President Sirleaf signed into law the National Forestry Reform Law of , passed by the legislature in mid-September in one of its first major legislative actions. In doing so, she fulfilled the U. Security Council's criteria for lifting its ban on exports of Liberia timber. Among other measures, the new law divided Liberia's forest lands into three categories: protected areas, areas where community logging and wood processing can be pursued, and commercial logging concession areas.

The law reportedly does not, however, clearly define how revenues for such services are to be divided among beneficiaries, which may make decision making processes pertaining to that end politically controversial.

Liberia's Forestry Development Authority has formulated a timber concession bidding process, based on the new forestry law, which was initially implemented in early Environmental activists are monitoring this process to ensure that it meets the forestry management, conservation, and other goals of the new law.

Liberia's forests are the home to diverse species of flora and fauna, some rare or endangered. According to U. They declined after the imposition of sanctions on such exports in , but U. Depending on such factors as price, rates of cutting, and relative use of sustainable forestry practices, future export levels could vary widely from those estimated for , when forestry concessions were administered by the Taylor regime and harvested by commercial interests with allegedly close links to the Taylor administration.

The Taylor regime was accused of allowing the use of unsustainable forestry practices and illicitly diverting earnings from the timber sector.

It also allegedly used some timber firms' transport and trade activities as cover for arms trafficking and turned the security forces of some firms into pro-government militias.

Security Council's passage on April 27, , of Resolution , which lifted an export ban on Liberian diamonds imposed by the Council in late Resolution The first post-embargo diamond exports began in September In order to meet Kimberley Process certification criteria, the Liberian government had suspended the issuance of diamond mining licenses, all of which expired at the end of December , making diamond mining effectively illegal in Liberia pending its accession to the Kimberley Process.

As part of its efforts to implement the Kimberley Process, the government now has a diamond office in Monrovia and several regional diamond certification offices. After ending his glamorous career in , Weah returned home and labored in restoring peace to Liberia, a nation rocked by an internal conflict. He mainly risked everything, including moving into dangerous terrains, to ensure a successful disarmament of thousands of ex-combatants in his capacity as UNICEF Goodwill Ambassador.

George Manneh Weah began his political career in Weah contested three elections and won two. He lost the presidential race in the runoff with former President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf in In , Weah contested and won the Montserrado County Senatorial by-election. Weah was inaugurated on January 22, According to Article 60 of the Liberian Constitution, salaries of the President and the Vice President are established by the National Legislature and cannot be increased or reduced during the period for which they are elected.

However, the President took the action in view of the very rapidly deteriorating economic situation of Liberia. He flew regularly to refugee camps hosting Liberians, most notably the Bujumbura camp in Ghana. He provided relief items, sponsored some refugees in school and gave air tickets to some who had the opportunity of traveling for better future.

Back home, Weah took charge of sponsoring the national team, Lone Star, which he captained and later served as technical director for, to honor international games at his personal expense.

He awarded scholarships to deserving and disadvantaged students and children respectively. To date, Weah has the highest number of scholarships in the country. The Liberian Leader, born in a Christian home, got converted as a Muslim in